



DISEC

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Welcome Letter

Dear delegates,

My name is Victoria, and I'm currently a freshman at MIT majoring in computer science with a minor in economics. I've always been fascinated with foreign affairs and policy making, so I'm excited to hear about all the amazing resolutions you and your fellow delegates will work on in DISEC. I'm also especially stoked to be chairing for MITMUNC this year as I've been a delegate at MITMUNC in the past!

I'm your other chair, Matthew. I'm a sophomore at MIT majoring in Computer Science. I'm interested in socioeconomic development and global perspectives on the digital economy. We look forward to seeing your ideas as we move into this year's MITMUNC.

In this committee, we welcome delegates of various backgrounds, regardless of the level of Model UN experience. We are eager to see all of you come forth with creative solutions, enthusiastic debate, and a willingness to grow and learn. You should submit your position papers five days prior to the beginning of the conference to the chairs at the following email: **disec-mitmunc-2023@mit.edu**.

Sincerely,

Victoria Ma and Matthew Yohanes

Topic 1: Addressing the use of cyberwarfare Introduction and History:

Over the past few decades, our world has become increasingly reliant on information technology. In particular, computer networking has granted newfound connectivity between individuals, states, and nations throughout a diverse array of industries spanning from healthcare and transportation to finance and defense. On one hand, these digital channels bring us numerous benefits, whether it be in democratizing educational resources or preserving human interaction in the midst of global pandemics. On the other hand, however, the prevalence of such digital infrastructure has opened up new opportunities for state and non-state actors alike to further political agendas in an emerging mode of attack: cyberwarfare.¹

Generally, many definitions of cyberwarfare are similar to that published by UNODC, who characterizes it as a collection of “cyber acts that compromise and disrupt critical infrastructure systems, which amount to an armed attack. An armed attack intentionally causes destructive effects (i.e. death and/or physical injury to living beings and/or destruction of property).” However, many government officials, journalists, and academics emphasize the many nuances to “cyberwarfare” as well, resulting in various related terms such as “hacktivism,” “cyberespionage,” “cyberterrorism,” and “information warfare.”² These different concepts arise from the different contexts or perceived motivations behind the use of cyberwarfare – therefore, in order to further understand the problems associated with cyberwarfare and work with your fellow delegates on possible solutions to the multifaceted issue, we have provided further detail and contemporary examples below:

¹ <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/towards-cyberpeace-managing-cyberwar-through-international-cooperation>

² <https://www.unodc.org/e4/en/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/cyberwarfare.html>

I. Cyberwarfare and military infrastructure

In 2010, a large-scale cyberattack was launched upon Iran's Natanz nuclear site, located just south of Tehran. Iranian cybersecurity measures managed to preserve much of the site's functionality throughout the attack, with Iran's Communications Minister Azari-Jahromi reporting to state media that "Iran's university scientists have developed a firewall for industrial automation systems to neutralize industrial sabotage...". However, the attack did succeed in halting 10% of the facility's uranium enrichment processes for the following year. In its aftermath, Iran launched an investigation into the attack, and researchers eventually uncovered a malicious computer worm (self-replicating malware) known as Stuxnet. It soon became widely believed that the United States, in conjunction with Israel, had developed Stuxnet and launched the virus in an attempt to disrupt the Natanz facility's systems – and by extension, the development of Iranian nuclear capabilities as a whole. Though neither the U.S. nor Israel ever claimed responsibility for the attack in response to these discoveries, political tensions between Iran and Israel only grew, with Iran declaring the event as an act of "nuclear terrorism" and vowing for revenge against Israel.³

Over the past decade, the Stuxnet example has grown especially important in policymakers' approaches to developing cyber-related regulations as it was "the first publicly known example of a virus being used to attack industry machinery," as a Reuters article describes it.⁴ Indeed, it raises many necessary questions that you and your fellow delegates will need to address in DISEC. For instance, should there be greater accountability for UN member states' use of malicious programs such as Stuxnet? And perhaps even more importantly to begin with, how should the UN properly investigate potential cyber crimes against military infrastructure, such that the perpetrators of such attacks are identified without bias?

³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56715520>

⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-israel-stuxnet/iran-builds-firewall-against-stuxnet-computer-virus-minister-idUSKCN1SM116>

II. Cyberwarfare and the influence of social media

In the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, escalated in February 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, numerous research labs across the world have conducted studies on the growing online activity related to the war. One such study, conducted by the University of Adelaide in Australia, analyzed millions of posts on Twitter with hashtags on both sides of the emerging conflict – “#(I)StandWithUkraine,” “#(I)SupportRussia,” etc. – and found that 60-80% of these tweets had originated from bot accounts, with pro-Russian accounts having disproportionate effects on increasing heated tensions over online discussions and even swaying Ukrainian users’ decisions to flee or stay. Indeed, within a week of the Russian invasion, Twitter banned approximately 100 bot accounts (out of estimated hundreds more) for “coordinated inauthentic activity,” creating and liking posts that spread pro-Russian justifications for the war.⁵

As one of the researchers on the Adelaide study puts it, “In the past, wars have been primarily fought physically, with armies, air force and navy operations being the primary forms of combat. However, social media has created a new environment where public opinion can be manipulated at a very large scale.”⁶ Unlike the prior Stuxnet example, cyberattacks in the form of information warfare are much less tangible and increasingly difficult to detect. How will you and your fellow delegates aim to target this emerging issue, while also respecting the civil liberties of UN member states’ populations?

⁵ <https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2022-03-30/ukraine-war-twitter-bot-network-amplifies-russian-disinformation/100944970>

⁶ <https://www.adelaide.edu.au/newsroom/news/list/2022/09/08/bots-manipulate-public-opinion-in-russia-ukraine-conflict>

III. Cyberwarfare and vigilantism

Anonymous is well-known for its status as an international hacktivist collective/movement. It has claimed responsibility for numerous cyberattacks on various government institutions and corporations over the past two decades since its formation in 2003, and many have been arrested in affiliation with Anonymous cyberattacks in countries spanning all over the globe, from the U.S. and U.K. to South Africa and India.⁷ On one hand, proponents of Anonymous may refer to the collective as “freedom fighters” or digital Robin Hoods, and on the other hand, opponents may associate Anonymous with “cyber terrorists”. Regardless of one’s opinions of the group, however, one cannot deny the group’s influence. In 2012, *Time* listed Anonymous among the world’s “100 most influential people,” and just recently in February 2022, in response to the invasion of Ukraine, Anonymous declared a “cyber war” against Russia itself.⁸

Although Anonymous may be glorified as a vigilante group, especially without specific political ties or loyalty to a single government of any country, it’s undeniable that Anonymous’ actions have proven dangerous and even anarchic at times over the years. Therefore, unlike the Stuxnet or Twitter bot examples where perpetrators of cyberattacks may be linked to specific UN member states, how can the UN resolve the issue of non-state actors perpetrating cyber attacks?

⁷ <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/25/what-is-anonymous-the-group-went-from-4chan-to-cyberattacks-on-russia.html>

⁸ <https://theconversation.com/the-hacker-group-anonymous-has-waged-a-cyber-war-against-russia-how-effective-could-they-actually-be-178034>

Key terms:

- **Cyberwarfare:** a collection of “cyber acts that compromise and disrupt critical infrastructure systems, which amount to an armed attack. An armed attack intentionally causes destructive effects (i.e. death and/or physical injury to living beings and/or destruction of property).”⁹
- **Cybersecurity:** “the practice of deploying people, policies, processes and technologies to protect organizations, their critical systems and sensitive information from digital attacks.”¹⁰
- **State actor:** an individual or organization acting on the behalf of a government body.
- **Non-state actor:** an individual or organization without affiliation with any government.
- **White hat hacker:** an “ethical” security hacker that works to identify vulnerabilities in an existing system with the consent of the system owner.
- **Black hat hacker:** a security hacker with “malicious” intent that works to exploit vulnerabilities in an existing system for personal or political gain.
- **Vigilante:** “a member of a volunteer committee organized to suppress and punish crime summarily (as when the processes of law are viewed as inadequate),” according to Merriam-Webster.
- **Hactivism:** “intentional access to systems, websites, and/or data without authorization or having exceeded authorized access, and/or the intentional interference with the functioning and/or accessibility of systems, websites, and data without authorization or having exceeded authorized access, in order to effect social or political change.”¹¹

Additional questions to consider:

- How should the UN define cyberwarfare more clearly, given its many different aspects?

⁹ <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/cyberwarfare.html>

¹⁰ <https://www.gartner.com/en/topics/cybersecurity#:~:text=Cybersecurity%20is%20the%20practice%20of%20sensitive%20information%20from%20digital%20attacks.>

¹¹ <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/hactivism.html>

- How should the UN work to identify whether cyberattacks originate from non-state vs. state actors?
- Are there new technologies that the UN should consider utilizing in its approaches to combating cyberwarfare?
- How should UN member states work to implement preventative measures against possible vulnerabilities in systems (both private and public) that are vital to national security?

Additional readings:

- Stuxnet
 - <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-israel-stuxnet/iran-builds-firewall-against-stuxnet-computer-virus-minister-idUSKCN1SM116>
 - <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56715520>
- Russo-Ukrainian War
 - <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/22/information-warfare-in-russias-war-in-ukraine/>
- Anonymous
 - <https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?entryid=3603>

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Accessed 10 Dec. 2022.

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www.adelaide.edu.au/newsroom/news/list/2022/09/08/bots-manipulate-public-opinion-in-russia-ukraine-conflict. Accessed 15 Dec. 2022.

"Hacktivism." *UNODC*, www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/hacktivism.html.

Accessed 11 Dec. 2022.

Huddleston, Tom, Jr. "What is Anonymous? How the infamous 'hacktivist' group went from 4chan trolling to launching cyberattacks on Russia." *CNBC*, 25 Mar. 2022, What is Anonymous? How the

infamous 'hactivist' group went from 4chan trolling to launching cyberattacks on Russia.

Accessed 23 Dec. 2022.

"Iran builds firewall against Stuxnet computer virus: minister." *Reuters*, 16 May 2019,

www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-israel-stuxnet/iran-builds-firewall-against-stuxnet-computer-virus-minister-idUSKCN1SM116. Accessed 14 Dec. 2022.

"Iran vows revenge for 'Israeli' attack on Natanz nuclear site." *BBC*, 12 Apr. 2021,

www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56715520. Accessed 14 Dec. 2022.

Medbury, Jennifer, and Paul Haskell-Dowland. "The hacker group Anonymous has waged a cyber war against Russia. How effective could they actually be?" *The Conversation*, 28 Feb. 2022,

theconversation.com/the-hacker-group-anonymous-has-waged-a-cyber-war-against-russia-how-effective-could-they-actually-be-178034. Accessed 14 Dec. 2022.

Purtill, James. "Twitter bot network amplifying Russian disinformation about Ukraine war, researcher says." *ABC*, 29 Mar. 2022,

www.google.com/url?q=https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2022-03-30/ukraine-war-twitter-bot-network-amplifies-russian-disinformation/100944970&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1671829361690630&usg=AOvVaw1DZjeLCHzYYRv9JFWtXXhr. Accessed 10 Dec. 2022.

Talihärm, Anna-Maria. "Towards Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberwar Through International Cooperation."

United Nations, Aug. 2013,

www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/towards-cyberpeace-managing-cyberwar-through-international-cooperation. Accessed 9 Dec. 2022.

"What Is Cybersecurity?" *Gartner*,

www.gartner.com/en/topics/cybersecurity#:~:text=Cybersecurity%20is%20the%20practice%20of,sensitive%20information%20from%20digital%20attacks. Accessed 15 Dec. 2022.

Topic II: Preservation of peace and de-weaponization after the Ethiopia-Tigray peace agreement

Introduction

Within Ethiopia, which had seen promising signs of reform and stabilization, war had broken out between the centralized government and the ethnic region of Tigray. On November 3, 2020, Tigrayan security forces loyal to the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) initiated a multipronged attack on the Northern Command HQ and on several national bases all located in the Tigray region.¹² TPLF described the attack as a "pre-emptive" strike in retaliation against the federal government of Ethiopia.¹³ This sparked the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to launch a military offensive against the regional forces in Tigray. War broke out immediately after the Northern Command attacks as the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) mobilized troops to pass the Tigray border.

However, tensions had been high between the national government and Tigrayan leaders preceding these attacks. In the 1970s and 1980s, a military junta ruled Ethiopia, but in 1991, a new coalition government composed of four ethnically-based parties took power¹⁴. Because the TPLF played a major role in seizing government control, they dominated the new coalition government, even though they are a minority ethnic group. Although Ethiopia grew more stable under the coalition government and the coalition granted autonomy to Ethiopia's regions, it was criticized for being politically repressive, controlling, and obstructing human rights. Protests led to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed creating a new Prosperity Party which gained popular support and allowed him to assume leadership of a new centralized government that promised peace, unity, and development across Ethiopia, while removing Tigrayan leaders accused of corruption and oppression in 2018. On both the national and international stages, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was exalted for liberalizing politics and negotiating the peace of a two decades-long border conflict with Eritrea, earning him a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019¹⁵.

¹²"Ethiopia's Tigray crisis: How a soldier survived an 11-hour gun battle." BBC, 10 December 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55215431>.

¹³ Mules, Ineke. "Ethiopia: A timeline of the Tigray crisis – DW – 11/17/2020." DW, 17 November 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-a-timeline-of-the-tigray-crisis/a-55632181>.

¹⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378>

¹⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nobel-prize-peace-idUKKBN1WQ12Q>

Meanwhile, internal turmoil was brooding in Ethiopia, as Tigrayan leaders rejected the new government as trying to centralize power and destroy the federal system in place. These tensions were further inflamed when national elections were delayed multiple times due to the COVID-19 pandemic, extending Abiy Ahmed's first term as prime minister¹⁶. Against federal rules, the Tigray government decided to hold its own regional elections and ultimately, the Northern Command attacks erupted and brought official war.

The Ethiopian government's armed forces shelled, looted, and destroyed civilian structures in Tigray, such as hospitals, schools, factories, and businesses¹⁷. Alongside cutting telecommunications in Tigray, the federal government has blocked food, water, and medical aid from the region. In 2021, the U.S. described the conflict as an attempt of ethnic cleansing by the Ethiopian federal government¹⁸. Although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed initially denied it, Eritrean forces had joined the Ethiopian federal troops in fighting against the TPLF. The TPLF has been labeled as a terrorist group and all sides, including the ENDF, TPLF, and other associated groups have all been accused of committing human rights violations, including rape as a weapon of war, violence against children, and ethnically targeted killings¹⁹. Over two million people have displaced, with many taking refuge in Sudan, and there are more than 2.3 million in need of humanitarian assistance. The Tigray conflict has also spilled into the Amhara and Afar regions, as Tigrayan forces attempted to break the military blockade. Although reporting is severely limited due to cut communications, there have been an estimated at least 10,000 reported deaths and 230 massacres²⁰.

I. Disarmament and stability of Ethiopia-Tigray peace agreements

TPLF forces and the Ethiopian government agreed to a peace treaty on November 2, 2022, formally ending the two-year Tigray War. The peace deal established reconnection between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia and "permanent cessation of hostilities"²¹. Since the deal

¹⁶ <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia>

¹⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/tag/tigray-conflict>

¹⁸ <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia>

¹⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/13/un-probe-in-ethiopias-tigray-didnt-reach-axum-massacre>

²⁰ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349824181_Tigray_Atlas_of_the_humanitarian_situation

²¹ "Ethiopia: Government, Tigrayan forces agree to end two-year war." *Al Jazeera*, 2 November 2022,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/ethiopias-warring-sides-agree-cessation-of-hostilities-au>.

was put in order, restrictions on aid were removed and services such as air travel, electricity, and telecommunications were restored to parts of the Tigray region, though many communities still do not have access to electricity, communications, and banking services^{22 23}. Both sides agreed to begin to disarm forces, but neither side has taken action to fully disarm and withdraw forces. De-escalation of arms will be essential to restoring unity and peace to Ethiopia.

Still, more efforts are needed to address starvation and illness exacerbated by the war. The UN World Food Programme estimates that "nearly half of Tigray's population is in severe need of food aid"²⁴. Without proper government response to the crises facing the region, tensions between Tigrayans and the Ethiopian government may escalate once again. Providing enough aid and services to Tigray's civilians is important to maintaining peace and security in Ethiopia. The UN Food Programme is currently engaging in providing food aid to Tigray as Abiy Ahmed relaxes restrictions in and out of the region²⁵. At the same time, there is the shortage of humanitarian aid to keep up with the high demand around the world, including in Ukraine . Meanwhile the international community, including the African Union, Kenya, and South Africa have actively mediated the peace treaty and are invested in maintaining peace. The U.S. has also threatened to impose sanctions if parties reject peace treaty measures²⁶.

II. Addressing Amhara militias and Eritrean forces in the Tigray region

As of November and December 2022, Eritrean forces have begun to withdraw from two major Tigray towns. However, the uncertainty of Eritrean and Amharan presence in the region causes lingering tension that hostilities may flare up again and that their presence may lead the

²² Muhumuza, Rodney. "Electricity, telecoms return to parts of Tigray following cease-fire with Ethiopia." *PBS*, 7 December 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/electricity-telecoms-return-to-parts-of-tigray-following-cess-e-fire-with-ethiopia>.

²³ Musambi, Evelyne. "Ethiopian Airlines resumes flights to Tigray's capital." *AP News*, 28 December 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-government-4f9248c450fd6b8a737761fbb024101d>.

²⁴ Paravicini, Giulia. "Nearly half the people in Ethiopia's Tigray in 'severe' need of food aid, World Food Programme says." *Reuters*, 19 August 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nearly-half-people-ethiopias-tigray-need-food-aid-wfp-2022-08-19/>.

²⁵ Burke, Jason. "Food aid convoys enter Tigray for first time since ceasefire." *The Guardian*, 16 November 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/food-aid-convoys-tigray-ethiopia-ceasefire>.

²⁶

<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-sets-out-long-road-peace-after-two-years-war-2023-01-05/>

TPLF to refuse to fully disarm as well²⁷. Although the treaty stated that both Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian troops would concurrently withdraw from the Tigray region, Eritrea and Amhara were not explicitly mentioned, making relations between their leadership with the ENDF and TPLF a critical consideration for establishing long-term peace. In addition territory neighboring Tigray where fighting had elapsed, remains disputed, claimed both by Tigray and the neighboring region of Amhara. Territorial dispute could reignite conflict and explicit address of the positions of Eritrea and Amhara will be key in continued peace negotiations.

III. Rising tensions in Oromia region

Ethnic tensions in Ethiopia have existed and spiraled beyond the conflict between the federal government and Tigray region. The region of Oromia, the largest in Ethiopia, has recently become a hotbed for conflict, both with the federal government and Amhara regional government. As Ethiopian security forces fight the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which they have designated as a terrorist organization, Oromo and Amhara forces battle each other over historic and current conflicts. In the past, residents of Oromia and Amhara have coexisted peacefully, though with tension due to Amhara leading the Ethiopian government for though being second most populous to Oromia, until 2019 when Abiy Ahmed took power. Conflict escalated when the OLA split from the central Oromo political party and began targeting Amhara, with retaliation from the Amhara militia²⁸. In December 2022, sightings have been reported of Oromia special forces killing members of the Amhara community indiscriminately and mostly using guerilla warfare, with hundreds fleeing the area²⁹. At the same time, Amhara militants, known as Fano, have also been accused of killing, destroying infrastructure, and looting in Oromia in recent weeks. According to an Oromo government official, in the Kiramu district, Fano had killed 244 Oromo civilians, burnt 568 homes, and stole 25,000 cattle. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has stated that throughout September to December of 2022, hundreds of people had been killed across 10 zones in Oromia.

Although the Ethiopian government has sent security forces to the region, it has not yet publicly addressed the conflict, partially consumed by easing tensions with Tigray. Within Ethiopia, political groups and rallies have demanded government mediation of the violence in Oromia. Without proper intervention, the regional conflict risks spreading into a greater ethnic struggle across the nation and beyond.

²⁷

<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-sets-out-long-road-peace-after-two-years-war-2023-01-05/>

²⁸ <https://apnews.com/article/politics-africa-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-d84fd5202c0008559026529d08e7f6dd>

²⁹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63710783>

Key Terms:

Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front: A political party and paramilitary organization founded in February, 1975 that led a multi-ethnic coalition to overthrow the Derg military government of Ethiopia. TPLF became the ruling party of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991-1995 after the fall of Derg and remained the ruling party of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1995-2018.

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front: A multi-ethnic political coalition founded by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front that was responsible for the overthrow of the Derg government and establishment of a dominant-party federal democratic government from 1991 to 2019. The EPRDF was dissolved in 2019 by current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed after establishing the Prosperity Party, a merger of the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern People’s Revolutionary Fronts.

Prosperity Party: The dominant political party of Ethiopia from 2019 to present founded by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Former parties of the EPRDF were merged into the Prosperity Party except for TPLF. The goals of the party are to replace the ethnic federalist administration while strengthening national unity.

2014-2016 Oromo Protests: A series of protests led by ethnic Oromo youth against the TPLF-led government. Despite oromos being the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the federal government was influenced mainly by the Tigrayan minority wing of the EPRDF.

Relevant Nations:

United States of America: In response to outcries and demonstrations by Tigrayan-Americans, the Biden administration took the position of pressuring the Ethiopian government to make peace with Tigrayan forces. During the war, the US imposed economic sanctions in response to the human rights crisis taking place in northern Ethiopia.³⁰ The United States was also a mediator in the Pretoria peace talks that led to the ceasefire between the Ethiopian federal government and TPLF. As access to the northern region is restored in Ethiopia, UN food aid rushed through to provide to those severely in need. The US takes part in providing international aid to developing nations. Should the US revamp it’s aid program in Ethiopia to account for the aid shortages facing Tigray? Or has the US done enough work in advocating peace between Ethiopian federal and Tigrayan regional forces?

China: The People’s Republic had a long-standing relationship with Ethiopia through economic cooperation and development efforts during the 21st century. The Chinese Communist Party established 4 billion dollars in projects in developing Ethiopian manufacturing, construction, and infrastructure. The

³⁰ “Issuance of Ethiopia Sanctions Regulations; Implementation of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act.” *Treasury Department*, 8 February 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220208>.

CCP followed a policy of non-intervention during the Tigray war, discouraging international involvement in the conflict.³¹ As Ethiopia and Tigray transition into peace, China is in a position to help provide aid to the war-torn northern region of Ethiopia. Whether it will or won't is the decision of the CCP.

Russia: Promoted non-intervention in the war.

Egypt: There is growing tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over water supply on the Nile river after Ethiopia completes construction of dam on Nile. Egypt is also a close partner of Sudan.

Ethiopia: Main belligerent in the Tigray war. Ethiopia voiced against Western intervention in the war, faces conflicts in Oromia, is in short supply of needed aid in the Tigray region in short supply of needed aid, and still has Amhara militias engaged in fighting.

Sudan: Millions of Tigrayans fled their homes to escape ethnic cleansing, rape, and starvation during the Tigray War. An estimated 59,000 Ethiopians fled into eastern Sudan seeking asylum. A nation which is limited in its resources, the Sudanese government is faced with caring for the wellbeing and safety of these refugees. If Ethiopian and Tigrayan leaders do not work effectively to restore goods and services in northern Ethiopia, more refugees may flee into Sudan.

South Africa: Facilitated peace talks between Ethiopia and Tigray.

UAE: Provided military drones to Ethiopian government.

Kenya: Kenya took part in facilitating peace talks between TPLF and Ethiopia. TPLF and Ethiopian leaders exchanged peace treaties in Kenya's capital of Nairobi on November 12, 2022. Kenya is a neighbor of Ethiopia and has been outspoken on restoring peace in the country. The nation also tightened its security on the northern border in fear of an unmanageable influx of refugees.³² Now with the war over, is this where Kenya's involvement in the conflict ends? Or should Kenya continue to support peace in Ethiopia to prevent risk of another conflict.

Turkey: Provided military equipment to Ethiopian government.

Iran: Provided military equipment to Ethiopian government.

Somalia: Allegations of Somali troops supporting the federal government against the TPLF.

³¹ Sany, Joseph. "Despite High Stakes in Ethiopia, China Sits on the Sidelines of Peace Efforts." *United States Institute of Peace*, 19 January 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts>.

³² Kaledzi, Isaac. "Ethiopia's war triggers fears in Kenya, South Sudan – DW – 11/08/2021." *DW*, 8 November 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-war-triggers-fears-in-kenya-south-sudan/a-59758399>.

Additional questions to consider:

- How should the UN mediate international involvement in de-escalating conflict in the Tigray region (e.g. imposing sanctions, providing aid, and refugee support)?
- How can the UN work towards providing reliable reporting and assistance in regions lacking in communications access and infrastructure?
- How does Ethiopia's internal conflict impact the broader border and ethnic identity crisis throughout the Horn of Africa?
- How can Ethiopia leverage its strategic geopolitical and economic position to regain long-term stability?